| Internet-Draft | BGPsec Transition | May 2025 |
| Xu, et al. | Expires 28 November 2025 | [Page] |
This document describes a means to facilitate the deployment of BGPsec. It modifies the BGPsec_PATH attribute to a transitive attribute and then addresses some problems brought by this change. It still aims to attest that every AS within the sequence of ASes enumerated in the UPDATE message has explicitly authorized the advertisement of the route.¶
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.¶
The latest revision of this draft can be found at https://FCBGP.github.io/BGPsec-Transition/draft-wang-sidrops-bgpsec-transition.html. Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-wang-sidrops-bgpsec-transition/.¶
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/FCBGP/BGPsec-Transition.¶
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The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] lacks inherent security mechanisms, especially for its Autonomous Systems (ASes) path and origin prefix information, making it vulnerable to route leaks and hijackings.¶
BGPsec, defined in [RFC8205], extends BGP to enhance security for AS path information. However, it employs an optional non-transitive BGP path attribute to carry digital signatures, complicating incremental deployment.¶
This document aims to facilitate the deployment of BGPsec.¶
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶
Traditional BGPsec is hard to achieve incremental deployment. This document mainly focuses on making BGPsec incrementally deployable.¶
It has at least two barriers to make BGPsec become transitive BGPsec. In the OPEN phase, BGPsec requires two BGPsec peers to negotiate BGPsec capability and multiprotocol capability. In the UPDATE phase, the BGPsec_Path attribute is a non-transitive attribute.¶
This document renders BGPsec transitive to facilitate the deployment of BGPsec.¶
TODO Security¶
This document has no IANA actions.¶
TODO acknowledge.¶